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appreciated. Abstract: Exogenous Targeting Instruments as a Solution to Group Moral Hazards
The ability of four contracts within the general class of exogenous targeting instruments,
proposed by Segerson (1988), to induce socially optimal outcomes in a group moral hazard
environment is investigated in an experiment based on Nalbantian and Schotter (1987).  Both
contracts based on the Holmstrom (1982) forcing contract with multiple equilibria, and contracts
based on the Segerson study with unique equilibria are tested.  My result -- that contracts can be
designed that mitigate the moral hazard problem at the aggregate level -- is a significant advance
on the result of Nalbantian and Schotter -- that costly monitoring or competitive teams are
required to solve the moral hazard problem.  It is shown that this result is robust to uncertainty as
well as experience.  However, none of the contracts insures compliance at the individual level, and
as a result hefty fines may be accrued by individuals even when they choose the socially optimal
action.  (JEL H21, C92)1
Inducing workers to choose the optimal level of effort, agents to contribute the optimal
amount to a public good or reduce their consumption of a common resource, firms to choose the
optimal level to pollute, and even countries to reduce their emissions of green house gases are all
examples of the “moral hazard in groups” problem.   This common social problem is characterized
by a difference between socially and individually optimal actions, in combination with non-
observability of the individual agents’ actions.  As a result, some form of regulation or institution
is required to induce agents to make socially optimal choices. 
One well-known solution to the group moral hazard problem, in the context of workers’
effort, is the introduction of a principal who receives all the workers’ output if total output is
below the optimal level (Holmstrom 1982).  These kinds of contracts are often referred to as
“forcing contracts”.  Perhaps surprisingly, a number of recent attempts to implement forcing
contracts in laboratory settings have produced quite poor results.  For example, Nalbantian and
Schotter (1997) provide a laboratory test of Holmstrom's  forcing contract and find that it cannot
induce workers to supply the optimal level of effort.  The Isaac, Schmidtz and Walker (1989), and
Suleiman and Rapoport (1992) studies for threshold public goods, and common property
resources have produced similar results.  Taken together, these experiments provide little basis for
optimism that effective social institutions can be devised that solve this very common problem in
human societies.   
In this paper, I argue that the pessimism that seems to emerge from the above studies may
be misplaced.  It is misplaced largely because the class of solutions --discontinuous forcing
contracts-- that have received the bulk of theoretical and empirical attention to date, share a
multiple-equilibrium problem which is not present in simpler, continuous contracts.  In particular,2
in addition to the socially efficient “cooperative” equilibrium, these discontinuous forcing
contracts also have an equilibrium in which all agents choose individually, rather than socially
optimal actions (Arrow 1985).  In contrast, when optimal continuous (indeed linear) contracts are
designed, Nash equilibria are efficient and unique (Segerson 1988, McAfee and McMillan 1991). 
When such contracts are implemented in a controlled laboratory environment, they perform much
better than the “forcing” contracts hitherto examined. 
In more detail, this paper examines the ability of four contracts within a general class
proposed by Segerson (1988) to induce socially optimal outcomes in a group moral hazard
context.  These contracts use lump sum fines and bonuses, combined with a proportional tax or
subsidy on the difference between the actual group outcome and the socially optimal group
outcome.  Clearly this general class of contracts encompasses both discontinuous and continuous
“forcing” contracts.  In a laboratory experiment, cast in terms of a non-point source pollution
problem, subjects are asked to choose a decision number; penalties and bonuses are then based on
the total of these decision numbers (referred to as the group total)
1.  A “Tax-Subsidy”
(continuous) contract combines a tax and a subsidy depending upon whether the group total is
above or below the optimal level.  The “Tax” (continuous) contract involves only a tax if the
optimal level is exceeded.  The “Subsidy” (discontinuous) contract involves a subsidy and a bonus
which is provided if the group total is below the optimal level.  The “Group Fine” (discontinuous)
contract involves a lump-sum fine if the group total exceeds the optimal level. 
I find that under the continuous contracts the group total is not significantly different 
from the socially optimal level.  Further, this result is robust to both uncertainty and experience
with the environment.  However, the data show that these contracts do not ensure individual3
compliance.  An additional problem with these contracts is that agents may face substantial fines
even though they have chosen the socially optimal action.  I conclude that exogenous targeting
instruments are able to mitigate the moral hazard in groups problem but care must be taken in
their implementation.
I. Experimental Design
As mentioned, the experiment is cast in terms of the non-point source pollution problem
where individual decisions cannot be observed.  The underlying model is standard in the literature
on non-point source pollution (Segerson 1988, Malik 1990, and Xepapadeas 1992) and
experimental design decisions were made for consistency with Nalbantian and Schotter (1997). 
Six subjects (indexed by n=1,..,6) choose a decision number which determines a private benefit
and a social cost.  The higher the decision number, the higher the individual private benefit, and 
the higher the cost to the group.
In the laboratory environment, an individual’s private benefit, Bn, is quadratic in the
decision number, xn:
     for n = 1,...6  (1) Bn(xn) ’ 25&0.002(100&xn)2
Notice that an agents’s benefit is increasing in xn up to the “maximum” decision number, xmax =
100.  Subjects were provided a table listing the values of Bn(xn) for each (integer) value of xn
between 0 and 100.  The values of this benefit function for each decision number are shown in the
first frame of Figure 1.
The cost to the group depends on the total of the decision numbers,    , X’j
6
n’1 xn
which will be referred to as the group total.  Under the uncertainty treatment the group total
includes a random variable ,, uniformly distributed from -40 to +40, measured in units of  the4
decision number,  .  For simplicity the social cost from the decision number choices X’j
6
n’1 xn%,
are defined as a scalar multiple of the group total: D(X) = 0.3X.
Assuming that both the agents and the principal are risk-neutral, the socially optimal















It is straight forward to show that the socially optimal decision number for each agent is xn
* = 






is  600 which is the outcome that will be selected by profit maximizing agents in the absence of
any policy intervention.  As a result there is a role for a principal to penalize the agents if the
observed group total is above 150 or reward the agents if the group total is below 150.  Because
agent’s decisions are unobservable, group incentive contracts are utilized (Holmstrom 1982,
Segerson 1988,  McAfee and McMillan 1991, Xepapadeas 1991, 1992, Andolfatto and Nosal
1997).  Under these contracts each individual faces a profit function which is the benefit from the
individual decision minus some function of the measured group total:
for all n = 1,...,6 (3) An(xn)’Bn(xn)&Tn(X)
where Tn(X) is the incentive scheme or contract imposed by the principal.  Profit maximizing
agents will choose the socially optimal level of emission when TnN = DN assuming that Tn and D
are differentiable.5
Group Incentive Contracts
All of the contracts considered in this paper are of the form suggested by Segerson [1988]
for the non-point source pollution problem:
Tn(X) =      if X > X
* tn(X&X ()%Jn
  9 if X # X
*  (4) sn(X&X ()&$n
Where sn and tn are a subsidy and a tax respectively, $n is a bonus and Jn is a fine.  Since the
subsidy, tax, bonus and fine parameters are symmetric across individuals the subscripts can be
dropped.  
In general, there are multiple non-cooperative Nash equilibria and a unique cooperative
outcome which maximizes the group’s payoff under each of these contracts.  The non-cooperative
equilibria may be further divided into symmetric and asymmetric equilibria.  There are two types
of outcomes which may be symmetric equilibria: group compliance where all individuals choose
25 units and group non-compliance where all individuals choose 100 units.  Asymmetric equilibria
are characterized by any combination of individual decisions that sum to the  optimal group total
(150 units).  I will refer to these types of outcomes as asymmetric compliance.  I will refer to the
cooperative outcome which maximizes the total payoff received by the agents as the group
optimal outcome.  Achieving this outcome assumes that subjects can implicitly collude and as a
result I do not expect them to be achieved in this experiment. 
The important distinction between the different contracts is whether or not the agent’s
profit function is continuous.  If $n or Jn are non-zero the agent’s profit function will be
discontinuous.  This discontinuity results in both group compliance and group non-compliance
being Nash equilibria.  Similarly if sn and tn are both zero then asymmetric compliance outcomes6
are Nash equilibria.
Tax-Subsidy Contract
The Tax-Subsidy contract provides a subsidy if the group total is below the optimal level
and a tax if it is above the optimal level:
T(X) = 0.3*( X - 150 ) if X > 150
 9 0.3*( X - 150 ) if X # 150 (5)
Under certainty the individual payoff function is continuous:




The first order conditions for the agent’s decision problem are the same as for the social planner’s
problem (2).  Thus, an agent’s best response is always to choose xn = xn
* = 25 no matter what the
other agents do.  The symmetric group compliance outcome ( ), is therefore the only xn ’ 25 ￿n
Nash equilibrium.  However, there is a cooperative equilibrium where everyone chooses zero
units.  An individual’s benefit function, the Tax-Subsidy contract, and the individual’s profit
function given that all other subjects comply are all depicted in figure 1.  Table 1 presents the
incentives for compliance simplified down to a normal form game between subject n and the rest
of the subjects (the total of whose decisions are denoted X-n).  Uncertainty does not effect the
predictions of theory for this contract. 
Notice that each individual pays the entire damage due to the excess of the group total
over the standard.  Thus, the taxes paid by the agents could be quite high.  Consider the case were
everyone chooses 100 units.  Table 1 shows that in this case the profits for all of the firms are -
110 lab dollars.  Notice also from Table 1 that subjects may earn negative profits if they comply
and other subjects choose not to comply.7
Tax Contract
If agents can coordinate on the cooperative solution under the Tax-Subsidy contract, the
group total will be inefficiently low and the principal will be forced to pay a large amount to the
agents.  In contrast, under a Tax contract agents are taxed if the group total is above the optimal
but no subsidy is provided when the group total is below.
T(X) =    0.3*( X - 150 ) if X > 150 (7)
9  0 if X # 150
Thus an individual’s payoff function is
  if X # X
* (8) Bn’ 25&0.002(100&xn)
2




It is clear that this contract leads an agent to the socially optimal decision if X>X
*, since the first
order conditions are the same as for the social planner’s problem.  However, if the group total (X)
is less than the optimal level (X
*)
 an agent’s best response is to choose xn = 100, which results in
the group total exceeding the optimal level and an individual’s best choice being to choose xn =
25.   Figure 2 depicts an individual’s benefit function, the graph of the tax contract and the graph
of the agent’s payoff for each decision number, assuming that all other agents choose the optimal
level of emission (x
*
n = 25).  Table 2 presents the incentives for compliance; notice that symmetric
group compliance is the only Nash equilibrium.  The asymmetric outcomes are not Nash equilibria
under this contract as the individual profit function is always maximized where xn = 25.  If the
agents were able to collude they would choose the symmetric group-compliance outcome
( ) under this contract. xn ’ 25 ￿n
Under uncertainty the Tax contract is weaker because there is some probability that agents
will not be fined even if group total exceeds 150.  An individual’s profit function is the same as8
before except for the random variable which is added into the ambient level of pollution:
   if X # X
* Bn’ 25&0.002(100&xn)
2




The only Nash equilibrium under this contract is a symmetric outcome where everyone chooses
28 units.  Asymmetric outcomes are not Nash equilibria and the cooperative equilibrium is the
symmetric Nash equilibrium where each agent chooses 28 units.  As was the case for the Tax-
Subsidy contract it is again possible for individuals to face substantial losses even when they are in
compliance with the standard (see table 2).
Subsidy Contract
Both the Tax and Tax-Subsidy contracts assume that agents can be held liable for the
damages caused by their decisions.  If agents are not liable for their decisions they must be
subsidized for any reduction.  A pure subsidy contract provides subsidies if  the optimal group
total is attained.   Notice however that a marginal subsidy (sn) alone cannot induce compliance
with the standard because the ambient pollution subsidy (sn) does not change the slope of the
firm’s profit function for emission levels above 25 units (assuming all of the other agents comply). 
To induce compliance the payoff for choosing 25 units must be increased above the payoff for
choosing 100 units (given that all other agents comply).  As a result, a bonus ($n>0) is added to
the subsidy contract.  The Subsidy contract shares the real social benefit due to the reduction
among the agents if the standard is attained.
T(X) =              0 if X > 150
  9 0.3*( X - 150) + 22.50 if X # 150 (10)
where 22.50 represents an equal share of the real social benefits from an optimal reduction in the
group total.  This contract is equivalent to the Holmstrom forcing contract with the output being9
split among the agents if the optimal level of effort is provided.
Under certainty, an individual's payoff is given by a discontinuous function:





      9   otherwise. (11) 25&0.002(100&xn)2
In this case the individual’s decision problem provides the same incentives as the social planner’s
problem when the group total is below the optimal level (X# X
*) and as a result each agent
choosing xn = 25 is a Nash equilibrium.  However, if X>X
* then it is in an agent’s best interest to
maximize her private benefits (choose xn = 100) as the subsidy is not going to be received.  As a
result non-compliance (each agent choosing xn = 100) is also a Nash equilibrium under this
contract.  Figure 3 depicts an individual’s benefit function, the graph of the subsidy contract and
the graph of the agent’s profits for each decision number assuming that all other agents choose
the optimal decision (xn
* = 25).   
Table 3 presents the incentives for compliance.  Notice that it is in agent n’s best interest
to comply with the standard (choose xn = 25) as long as everyone else chooses to comply.  Notice
also that agents maximize the payoff to the group if everyone chooses 0 units.  Thus, this contract
is undesirable as the principal is likely to face capital constraints which would make subsidising
agents’ decisions infeasible.
Under uncertainty an individual’s profit is given by a discontinuous function:





        9 otherwise (12) 25&0.002(100&xn)2
In this case only group non-compliance is a Nash equilibrium.  Group compliance is no longer a
Nash equilibrium because even if all agents comply there is some probability that the subsidy will
not be provided.  As a result, an individual increases her expected profit by increasing her decision10
number.  As with the certainty case there are no asymmetric Nash equilibria, and the group payoff
is maximized if everyone chooses 0 units.
Group Fine Contract
The final contract is a forcing contract when the group total is above the optimal level as
opposed to the subsidy contract which is forcing when the level is below optimal.  Under the
Group Fine contract all of the agents are fined if the group total is above the optimal level:
T(X) = -24 if X > 150
  9   0 if X # 150 (13)
The value of the fine (-24) is chosen so that the marginal expected value of the contract is equal 
to the marginal damage at the optimum  under uncertainty
2.   MT(X)/M(xn)*X’X(’MD(X)/M(xn)*X’X(
Under both certainty and uncertainty an individual’s profit function is discontinuous:
Bn = 25-0.002(100-xn)
2   if X # X
*
        9   1-0.002(100-xn)
2 otherwise (14)
Under certainty, any set of decision numbers which sum to 150 are a Nash equilibrium.  An
agent’s best response to this contract is to choose a decision number which makes the group total
just equal to 150 (xn = 150 - X-n) if possible (50 < X-n # 150), and to choose xn = 100 if not      
(X-n<50 or X-n>150).  For both the certainty and uncertainty case group compliance, group non-
compliance and asymmetric compliance are Nash equilibria.  Group compliance is the group
optimal outcome for this contract.  Figure 5 shows the individual’s benefit function, the Group
Fine contract and an individual’s profit function given that everyone else complies and table 4
presents the incentives for compliance or non-compliance for the individual.  Notice that the
potential for large losses is not as sever under this contract as it is under the Tax-Subsidy and Tax
contracts.11
Table 5 summarizes the potential outcomes under certainty (C) and uncertainty (U) for the
four different contracts.  Notice that the Tax contract has one potential outcome, the Tax-Subsidy
and the Group Fine have two, the Subsidy contract has three potential outcomes.  Also notice that
the Tax-Subsidy and Tax contracts only have one Nash equilibrium while the Subsidy and Group
Fine contracts have two.  As a result it is more likely that the subjects will choose the socially
optimal outcome (group compliance) under the Tax-Subsidy and Tax contracts.
Design
Twenty four sessions were conducted at the McMaster Experimental Economics Lab
during the winter term of 1997.  Each session involved one group of six subjects who participated
in twenty-five periods for each of two different contracts.  Subjects were recruited from the
university population and earned on average twenty three dollars for a session which lasted
between 1 and 2 hours. 
In each period the subjects were asked to choose a decision number between 0 and 100
3. 
They were told that their total payoff in each period was the sum of a private payoff and a group
payoff.  The private payoff was found by looking up their decision number on a payoff table.  The
group payoff depended on the group total.  They were informed that the group total was the sum
of the decision numbers of all of the subjects, and in the uncertainty condition, a uniform random
variable between -40 and +40.  The group payoff was described using one of the four contracts
(Tax-Subsidy, Tax, Subsidy, or Group Fine).
To control for group effects it would be best to have each subject participate in each
contract.  Unfortunately, this was not feasible as it would have made the experimental sessions
too long.  In each session 25 periods of each of two contracts were presented.  Each contract was12
paired with each other contract for twelve pairings under certainty and uncertainty.  As a result
there are three replications of each contract under certainty and uncertainty in both the first and
second positions.
II.  Testable Hypotheses
Three theories are used to predict the outcomes from the experimental sessions: non-
cooperative game theory, non-cooperative game theory with equilibrium selection, and
cooperative game theory.  Non-cooperative game theory in this case just appeals to the concept
of Nash equilibrium.  There are unique Nash equilibria under the Tax-Subsidy and Tax contracts
but not under the Subsidy or Group Fine contracts.  To predict results for the Subsidy and Group
Fine contracts we need an equilibrium selection mechanism.  A common choice is payoff
dominance, which predicts that the group compliance equilibrium will be chosen for both of these
contracts.  Cooperative game theory suggests that under the Tax-Subsidy and Subsidy contracts
individuals will be able to coordinate on the group optimal outcome where each agent chooses
zero units.  These predictions are summarized in Table 6.
The effect of uncertainty on each of the contracts can also be tested.  The tax-subsidy
should perform equally well under certainty as under uncertainty.  The tax and subsidy contracts
are developed for the certainty case and as a result should perform better under certainty than
uncertainty, whereas, the group fine contract should perform better under uncertainty.
As people become more experienced with the environment they should be better able to
coordinate on the payoff dominate Nash equilibrium.  This implies that the results for the Subsidy
and Group fine contracts conducted in the second position should be more similar to the socially
optimal outcome than those conducted first.13
Results
Result 1:  The continuous contracts (Tax-Subsidy and Tax) are better able to enforce the
standard than the discontinuous contracts (Subsidy and Group Fine).
The first question is whether these contracts are able to induce the group to the socially
optimal outcome (or enforce the standard).  Table 7 presents the mean of the group total over all
25 periods of the three sessions in each cell.  The standard errors are large enough that none of
these mean group totals are significantly different from the socially optimal target of 150. 
However, notice that the group totals for the Subsidy and Group Fine contracts are larger and
have much higher standard errors in all cases.  Table 8 presents the mean of the mean group total
over the three sessions in each cell.  It could be argued that this is the proper statistic to use to
compare the contracts since the twenty five periods in each session are not independent.  Using
the mean of the group total across the twenty-five periods for each of the three sessions, the mean
group totals for the Tax-Subsidy contract under certainty in the second presentation, under
uncertainty in the first presentation, the Tax contract under certainty in the first presentation, and
the Group Fine contract under uncertainty in the second presentation are all significantly different
from 150.  Table 9 presents the percentage reduction in the group total from 600 (a reduction to
the socially optimal level 150 would be 100 percent).  This table shows that the group total is
reduced by much more under the Tax-Subsidy and Tax contracts.   
Figures 5 through 8 depict the Group Totals (i.e. total of the individual decision numbers)
in each of the twenty five periods for each contract, certainty and order condition.  These graphs
show that while the group totals tend to be around 150 under the Tax-Subsidy and Tax contracts,
the group total is often closer to 600 under the Subsidy and Group Fine contracts.  The14
observation that individuals choose non-compliance is consistent with the previous studies of
Holmstrom’s forcing contract (Isaac, Schmidtz, and Walker 1989, Rapoport and Suileiman 1992,
and Nalbantian and Schotter 1997).  
It is clear from these results that the Tax-Subsidy and Tax contracts are better able to
induce agents to the socially optimal outcome than the Subsidy and Group Fine contracts.  The
Box Whisker diagram presented in figure 9 shows this result quite clearly
4.
Result 2:  Result 1 is robust to uncertainty and experience
Table 8 and figures 5 through 8 show that neither uncertainty nor order of presentation
make much difference to the observed results.  Anova analysis conducted on the mean group
totals in each of the forty-eight sessions confirms that order and uncertainty are not significant
(p>.32 for order and p>0.72 for uncertainty) Table 11 and  Tables 12 through 15 show that order
is significant for the tax contract but otherwise all of the certainty and order variable are
insignificant even when the regressions are run separately by contract.  As a result, I claim that
not only are the Tax-Subsidy and Tax contracts able to induce a group to the social optimum but
that this result is robust to uncertainty and experience with the environment.
Result 3:  Individual free-riding is not eliminated
Figures 12 and 13 present the distributions of individual decision numbers by contract and
certainty condition.  These pictures show that agents free-ride to a greater extent under the
discontinuous contracts (Group Fine and Subsidy) contracts than they do under the continuous
contracts (Tax and Tax-Subsidy).  It is also clear that the variance in the decision numbers is
higher under uncertainty than under certainty except under the Group Fine contract where the
percentage of decision numbers in the 90 to 100 range is approximately 50 percent.  15
Result 4: Bankruptcy is important
The exogenous targeting instruments investigated in this paper are in a sense extreme.  If
one person chooses a non-socially optimal action all of the subjects are punished.  As a result
agents who choose the socially optimal action may earn significantly negative payoffs [see tables 1
through 4].  Subjects in the experiment were endowed with an opening balance to reduce the
likelihood of bankruptcy.  Despite this, bankruptcy was observed under all of the contracts where
it was possible (Table 10).  That agents who are in compliance are penalized for the non-
compliance of others may provide an incentive for these agents to find ways to credibly report
their actions.  This is an important issue in the environmental compliance literature as there are
many situations where regulation is based on self-reporting (Malik 1993, Swierzbinski 1994, and
Livernois and McKenna 1997).
III. Conclusions and Extensions
In a simple environment where moral hazard would result in non-compliance, exogenous
targeting instruments are able to induce compliance with a standard.  Four contracts: Tax-
Subsidy, Tax, Subsidy, and Group Fine have been tested in a controlled laboratory environment.
Of these, the two “forcing” contracts, suggested in work by Holmstrom (1981) and Andolfatto
and Nosal (1997) are unable to consistently enforce the standard.  In contrast, the two continuous
contracts, (Tax-Subsidy and Tax) are essentially effective without the need to resort to (costly)
monitoring of individual performance or to set up multiple, competing “teams” (Nalbantian and
Schotter 1997).  I find that these results are robust to uncertainty as well as to experience with the
environment.  16
It seems clear that a key explanation behind the inability of discontinuous, “forcing”
contracts to induce compliance with a standard is the coordination problem that arises under these
contracts.  Under the continuous contracts the marginal incentives induce agents to the socially
optimal outcome, whereas under discontinuous contracts the group needs to coordinate on one of
many possible Nash outcomes.  There is an extensive literature on coordination failures which
shows that even groups of two players have trouble coordinating when there as few as two
possible equilibria
5.  Further, sessions were conducted in which subjects were allowed to
communicate and they were consistently able to coordinate on the group optimal outcome. 
While cast in terms of a non-point source pollution problem, it is clear that the results of
this experiment --that “continuous” penalties and rewards, based on the difference between the
value of the observed statistic and the desired value work well-- have implications for the optimal
design of contracts in other situations.  For example, an analogous contract to the Tax-subsidy
contract in the worker effort case would work as follows: Workers could be paid some
proportion of the firm's profits such that the groups reward is below the firm's profit if the
workers produce less than the target level and the reward is above the firm’s profit if they
produce more.  Alternatively, the firm’s profits could be distributed among the workers and a
proportional fine could be charged if the target is not met and a proportional bonus provided
otherwise).  Isaac, Schmidtz, and Walker [1989] and Bagnoli and McKee [1991] address alternate
renumeration schemes in their threshold public good papers.  They investigate a full money back
guarantee as well as a partial (fifty percent) money back guarantee if the public good is not
provided.  They find that the full money back guarantee does increase compliance with the target
but the partial money back guarantee has no affect whatsoever.  They conclude that a full money17
back guarantee must be offered to induce compliance.  However, the results from this study
suggest that if the guarantee was proportional to the difference between the observed contribution
and the target, compliance would be induced.
Finally, it should be noted that even the “continuous” contracts examined in this paper are
not without problems.  For example, while “group” compliance is well-enforced, individual free-
riding is not eliminated by any of these contracts.  In future work I intend to appeal to recent
work done on bounded rationality (Anderson, Goeree, and Holt 1996) and experience weighted
attraction (Camerer and Ho 1997) to determine if better explanations can be provided for the
observed results
6.  Another potential concern is that Tax-Subsidy, Tax, and Group Fine contracts
may result in agents facing large fines or taxes even when they are in compliance with the
standard.  Further, the Tax-Subsidy and Subsidy contracts may result in significant costs to the
regulator if firms are able to collude.  Thus, some of these contracts may not be politically
feasible.  Still, I believe my results provide a basis for renewed optimism regarding the possibility
of designing simple but practically effective social institutions to control problems of moral hazard
in groups.
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Endnotes
1. In contrast to the worker effort case, note that lower group totals are socially preferred in
the pollution case.  It was however never suggested to subjects that their decision
variables might be interpreted in an environmental or any other context.
2. Notice that  under certainty.  Thus this contract should be more likely to MT(X)/Mxn’0
induce the socially optimal outcome under uncertainty.
3. A copy of the instructions as presented to the subjects is included as an appendix.
4. The box depicts the interquartile range, the line through the box the mean, and the
whiskers the upper and lower adjacent values [StataCorp 1997, Reference Volume 2, G-
O, page 60].
5. For example the battle of the sexes games studied by Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross
1990.
6.  The analysis presented in this paper ignores the fact that these are repeated games.  In




Agent n Over Comply: X-n = 0 Comply: X-n = 125 Non-compliance:  
 X-n = 500
Over Comply: xn = 0 50.00, 50.00 12.50, 21.25 -100, -80.00
Comply : xn = 25 51.25, 42.50 13.75, 13.75 -98.75, -87.50
Non-compliance:
xn = 100




Agent n Over Comply: X-n = 0 Comply: X-n = 125 Non-compliance:   
X-n = 500
Over Comply: xn = 0 5.00, 5.00 5.00, 13.75 -100, -80.00
Comply : xn = 25 13.75, 5.00 13.75, 13.75 -98.75, -87.50
Non-compliance:
xn = 100




Agent n Over Comply: X-n = 0 Comply: X-n = 125 Non-compliance:   
X-n = 500
Over Comply: xn = 0 72.50, 72.50 35.00, 43.75 5.00, 25.00
Comply : xn = 25 73.75, 65.00 36.25, 36.25 13.75, 25.00
Non-compliance:
xn = 100




Agent n Over Comply: X-n = 0 Comply: X-n = 125 Cheat: X-n = 500
Over Comply: xn = 0 5.00, 5.00 5.00, 13.75 -19.00, 1.00
Comply : xn = 25 13.75, 5.00 13.75, 13.75 -10.25, 1.00
Cheat: xn = 100 25.00, 5.00 1.00, -10.25 1.00, 1.00
TABLE 5
Potential outcomes under the four contracts




























* - Nash Equilibrium22
TABLE 6
Predicted outcomes under the four contracts
Contract
Tax-Subsidy Tax Subsidy Group Fine
Non-Cooperative  Game Theory
Certainty SC SC None None
Uncertainty SC SC
* None None
Non-Cooperative Game Theory and Equilibrium Selection




Certainty GO1 SC GO1 SC
Uncertainty GO1 SC
* GO1 SC
SC - Symmetric Compliance (25,25,25,25,25,25)
SC
* - Symmetric Compliance for the Tax Contract under uncertainty (28,28,28,28,28,28)
GO1 - Group Optimal (0,0,0,0,0,0)23
TABLE 7
Mean Decision Number Totals by Period 
Contracts Certainty Uncertainty Totals


































































Mean Decision Number Totals by Session (n=3/cell)
Contracts Certainty Uncertainty Totals


































































 Percentage Reduction in Group Total
Contracts Certainty Uncertainty Total





























































Means, Standard deviations, and number of observations.
TABLE 10
Number of Sessions in which Bankruptcy was observed, by Treatment
Contracts Certainty Uncertainty
First  Second First Second
Tax-Subsidy 0 1 1 0
Tax 0 1 1 0
Subsidy 0 0 0 0




     
Number of obs 
         48 
R-squared   
0.42
Root MSE  
   107.86
Adj R-squared      
        0.15
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob >F
Model 274546.47 15 18303.10 1.57 0.14
Treatment 204797.36 3 68265.79 5.87 0.0026
Uncertainty 1246.03 1 1246.03 0.11 0.75
Order 10105.93 1 10105.93   0.87 0.36
Interactions
Treatment   
Uncertainty
16054.06 3 5351.35 0.46 0.71
Treatment
Order
1943.58 3 647.86 0.06 0.98
Uncertainty 
Order




31947.06 3 10649.02 0.92 0.44
Residual 372270.15 32 11633.44
Total 646816.614 47 13762.06
               26
Table 11
OLS   Cont/.
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t P > |t|
Constant 163.4 62.41 2.62 0.01
Group Fine 217.8 88.26 2.47 0.02
Subsidy 130.15 88.26 1.48 0.15
Tax 8.23 88.26 0.09 0.93
Certainty 25.57 88.26 0.29 0.77
First 46.95 88.26 0.53 0.6
Group Fine & Certainty -156.31 124.83 -1.24 0.22
Subsidy & Certainty -86.64 124.83 -0.69 0.49
Tax & Certainty -13.48 124.83 -0.11 0.92
Group Fine & First -61.63 124.83 -0.49 0.63
Subsidy & First -106.13 124.83 -0.85 0.4
Tax & First -14.31 124.83 -0.12 0.91
Certainty & First -77.48 124.83 -0.62 0.54
Group Fine, Certainty & First 199.69 176.53 1.13 0.27
Subsidy, Certainty & First 254.76 176.53 1.44 0.16
Tax, Certainty & First 71.11 176.53 0.4 0.6927
TABLE 12
OLS for Tax Subsidy
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t P > |t| N=12
Constant 164.64 28.28 5.822 0 F(2,9) = 0.41
Certainty 13.17 17.05 0.772 0.46 Prob>F = 0.673




Variable Coefficient Std. Error t P > |t| N = 12
Constant 220.49 20.11 10.96 0 F(2,9) = 3.22
Certainty -8.91 12.13 -0.73 0.48 Prob>F = 0.088
Order -29.45 12.13 -2.43 0.04 R
2 = 0.42
TABLE 14
OLS for Subsidy Contract
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t P > |t| N = 12
Constant 333.83 134.14 2.49 0.04 F(2,9) = 0.12
Certainty -27.57 80.89 -0.34 0.74 Prob>F = 0.88
Order -29.45 80.89 -0.36 0.72 R
2 = 0.0269
TABLE 15
OLS for Group Fine Contract
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t P > |t| N = 12
Constant 257.92 151.3 1.7 0.12 F(2,9) = 0.42
Certainty 69.63 91.24 0.76 0.47 Prob>F = 0.67


































































Agent n's Benefit Function




























































Tax - Subsidy Contract













0  20  40  60  80  100 
Agent n's Decision
Tax-Subsidy Contract

































































Agent n's Benefit Function











0  20  40  60  80  100 
Agent n's Decision
Tax Contract






























































































































Agent n's Benefit Function
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Agent n's Benefit Function
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Assumes that all other agents comply32
Tax-Subsidy, Certainty, First
period






































Figure 5 : Tax-Subsidy Sessions33
Tax, Certainty, First
period






































Figure 6: Tax Sessions34
Subsidy, Certainty, First
period






































Figure 7: Subsidy Sessions35
Group Fine, Certainty, First
period
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Figure 8: Group Fine Sessions36
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Figure 13 Uncertainty38
Instructions 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. During the experiment your
payoffs will be reported in lab dollars.  At the end of the experiment your total earnings in lab
dollars will be converted to Canadian dollars and you will be paid in cash.   If you follow the
instructions carefully you may earn a considerable amount of money.  This research has been
funded by various agencies.  
Before we begin the actual experiment please fill out the form labelled lotteries which will
be found in your folder.  For each choice please put an X in the column beside Option A or
Option B.  After today’s session one of the choices will be selected at random, the lottery will be
conducted and you will be paid depending on your choice and the outcome from the lottery. 
Once you have completed the form raise your hand and it will be collected.
Overview
Today’s session will be conducted using the computer network located in our laboratory. 
The session will consist of 2 parts which will each last 25 periods.  We will begin after everyone
has finished reading the instructions and completed  5 practice periods.  Please refrain from
talking during the experiment. Each period will proceed as follows.
What the Computer does What you do
Start period.
Choose a “decision number” and enter it in the
appropriate box on your computer screen.
Collect decision numbers, Calculates
individual payoffs, and returns results
Check your payoff and cumulative payoff
Start next period or end section
Now here are the details.
Part 1
You have been assigned to a group of six (yourself and five other) participants.  This will
be your group for the entire experiment.  Everyone in your group has the same instructions.  This
part will consist of 25 periods.  In each period you (and the others in your group) will be asked to
choose a number between 0 and 100 and to enter it into the computer.  This is your Decision
Number.  
Your Total Payoff for each period is the sum of your Private Payoff and your Group Payoff:39
Total Payoff = Private Payoff + Group Payoff
Your Private Payoff depends only on your own Decision Number.  Table 1 in your folder
shows the Private Payoff for each possible Decision Number.  For example if your Decision
Number  were 60 Table 1 shows that your Private Payoff would be 21.80 lab dollars.  Or if you
had chosen 30 your Private Payoff would be 15.20 lab dollars.  Notice that the higher your
Decision Number the higher your Private Payoff.
The Group Payoff depends only on the Group Total and is the same for everyone in the
group. If the Group Total is greater than 150 then the Group Payoff will be zero.  If the Group
Total is less than or equal to 150, the Group Payoff is a positive value equal to 30% of the
difference between 150 and the Group Total, plus 22.50.  The Group Payoff can be written as the
following function of the Group Total:
Group Payoff =     0 if Group Total > 150
  9 0.3*( 150 - Group Total ) + 22.50 if Group Total # 150
For example if the Group Total were 130 then the Group Payoff for every member of the group
would be  0.3*(150-130) + 22.50 = 28.50 lab dollars.  Similarly if the Group total were 100 then
the Group Payoff for every member of the group would be  0.3*(150 -100) + 22.50 =  37.50 lab
dollars.  Notice that the lower the Group Total is below 150 the more positive (higher) the Group
Payoff.
As a simple example, suppose that you chose 60, everyone else in your group chose 20. 
The Group Total would be 160 (the sum of your decision number and the decision numbers of
everyone else in your group), your Private Payoff would be 21.80, the Group Payoff would be
Zero, and your Total Payoff would be 21.80 lab dollars.
Now suppose, that you had chosen 30 in the above example.  The Group Total would be
130, your Private Payoff 15.20, the Group Payoff would be 28.50, and your Total Payoff would
be 43.70 lab dollars.  Notice that the higher your Decision Number the higher your Private Payoff. 
But, the higher your Decision Number the higher the Group Total and the lower the Group
Payoff.
Your payment for this part of the experiment will be the sum of your earnings in each of
the 25 periods.  Your earnings for this part will be converted from lab dollars to Canadian at the
rate of 0.017 Canadian dollars per Lab dollar (each lab dollar is worth 1.7 cents Canadian). 
Please answer the following question:
Use table 1 to fill in the portion of the record sheet below assuming that you chose 75, the group
total was 125 and the group payoff is 30% of the difference between 150 and the group total plus 
22.50 if the group total is below 150 and zero otherwise.
Period Decision Number Private Payoff Group Total Group Payoff Total Payoff Cumulative Payoff
Practice40
Please raise your hand when you are done so that the monitor can check your answer.
Before we begin we will conduct five practice periods.  These practice periods are
intended to help you understand today’s experiment.  Any earnings you make during the practice
periods will not be included in your  payment at the end of the session.  The practice periods will
differ from the actual periods in that the Group Total will be your decision number plus a random
number chosen by the computer.  The Group Total in the practice periods will be your decision
number plus a random number between 0 and 500.  This random number is chosen by the
computer so that each number between and including 0 and 500 has an equal chance of being
selected.
Once the first practice period  starts you will notice that the game window on the
computer screen has four sections.  The first section describes the Group Payoff function.  This
function is the same as described in the instructions above.  The second section is labelled Scratch
Pad.  Using the Scratch Pad, you will be able to determine your payoff from different
combinations of values for your Decision Number and the Group Total.  Notice that you can
change the Decision Number and the Group Total by typing numbers into the edit boxes or by
using the arrow buttons located beside the edit boxes.  Also notice that changing the Decision
Number changes the Group Total.  This is because the Group Total is the sum of your Decision
Number, the Decision Numbers of those in your group and the random number and as a result
when your Decision Number increases so does the Group Total.  The third section of the screen is
where you type your Decision Number.  Once you have chosen your Decision Number and typed
it into the edit box click on the Ok button to complete this part of the period.  The fourth section
of the screen contains two tabs which allow you to switch between the main screen and the
history screen.  If you click on the tab labelled history you will be able to see the outcome of all of
the previous period in which you have participated.  Please feel free to raise your hand and ask
any questions you may have.
To help you understand the Scratch Pad please pick any number between 0 and 100 and
type it into the box beside Your Decision Number on the scratch pad.  Now pick a bigger number
and type it into the box beside Group Total.  Notice that the Group Total will always be bigger
than your Decision Number as it is the sum of the Decision Numbers of everyone in your group. 
Now use the arrow buttons beside the box where you typed Your Decision Number to increase or
decrease Your Decision Number.  Notice the effect of these changes on your Total Payoff.
Once the practice periods have been completed we will begin the 25 periods for which you
will be paid at the end of today’s session.
Part 2 - Instructions
This phase of the experiment will also consist of 25 periods.  You (and everyone else) are
in the same group as you were before. The only difference from the previous section is in how the
Group Payoff is calculated.  Once this part begins you will notice that you  have an opening
balance of 250 lab dollars.  If you should lose your opening balance you will receive no payment
for this part of the experiment.41
As before, in each period you (and the others in your group) will be asked to enter a
number between 0 and 100 on your computer screen.  This is your Decision Number.
Your Total Payoff for the period is the sum of a Private Payoff and a Group Payoff:
Total Payoff = Private Payoff + Group Payoff
Your Private Payoff is determined by Table 1 as before.  For example if your Decision
Number were 60 Table 1 shows that your private payoff would be 21.80 lab dollars.  Or if you
had chosen 30 your Private Payoff would be 15.20 lab dollars.  Notice that the higher your
Decision Number the higher your Private Payoff.
The Group Payoff depends only on the Group Total and is the same for everyone in the
group.  If the Group Total is less than or equal to 150 then the Group Payoff will be zero.  If the
Group Total is greater than 150, the Group Payoff is  -24.  The Group Payoff can be written as
the following function of the Group Total:
Group Payoff =   -24 if Group Total > 150
  9     0 if Group Total # 150
For example if the Group Total were 200 then the Group Payoff for every member of the group
would be  -24 lab dollars.  Whereas, if the Group Total were 100 then the Group Payoff for every
member of the group would be 0 lab dollars.
As a simple example, suppose that you chose 60 and everyone else in your group chose
20.  The Group Total would be 160 (the sum of your decision number and the decision numbers
of everyone else in your group), your Private Payoff would be 21.80, the Group Payoff would be
-24, and your Total Payoff would be -2.20 lab dollars.
Now suppose, that you had chosen 30 in the above example.  The Group Total would be
130, your Private Payoff 15.20, the Group Payoff would be 0, and your Total Payoff would be
15.20 lab dollars.  Notice that the higher your Decision Number the higher your Private Payoff. 
But, the higher your Decision Number the higher the Group Total and the lower the Group
Payoff.
Your payment for this session will be the sum of your earnings in each of the 25 periods. 
Your earnings will be converted from lab dollars to Canadian at the rate of 0.025 Canadian dollars
per Lab dollar (each lab dollar is worth 2 ½ cents Canadian).  In the event that you do lose your
opening balance you will be informed by the computer that you are Bankrupt and will not be able
to participate in the rest of this part of the experiment.  At this point the rest of the people in your
group will be informed that there is now one less person whose decision number is being added
into the group total.
Please answer the following question:
Use table 1 to fill in the portion of the record sheet below assuming that you chose 75, the group42
total was 125 and the group payoff is -24 if the group total is above 150 and zero otherwise.
Period Decision Number Private Payoff Group Total Group Payoff Total Payoff Cumulative Payoff
Practice
Please raise your hand when you are done so that the monitor can check your answer.43
TABLE 1:  Private Payoff Schedule
Choice Private Payoff Choice Private Payoff
0  5.00  51  20.20 
1  5.40  52  20.39 
2  5.79  53  20.58 
3  6.18  54  20.77 
4  6.57  55  20.95 
5  6.95  56  21.13 
6  7.33  57  21.30 
7  7.70  58  21.47 
8  8.07  59  21.64 
9  8.44  60  21.80 
10  8.80  61  21.96 
11  9.16  62  22.11 
12  9.51  63  22.26 
13  9.86  64  22.41 
14  10.21  65  22.55 
15  10.55  66  22.69 
16  10.89  67  22.82 
17  11.22  68  22.95 
18  11.55  69  23.08 
19  11.88  70  23.20 
20  12.20  71  23.32 
21  12.52  72  23.43 
22  12.83  73  23.54 
23  13.14  74  23.65 
24  13.45  75  23.75 
25  13.75  76  23.85 
26  14.05  77  23.94 
27  14.34  78  24.03 
28  14.63  79  24.12 
29  14.92  80  24.20 
30  15.20  81  24.28 
31  15.48  82  24.35 
32  15.75  83  24.42 
33  16.02  84  24.49 
34  16.29  85  24.55 
35  16.55  86  24.61 
36  16.81  87  24.66 
37  17.06  88  24.71 
38  17.31  89  24.76 
39  17.56  90  24.80 
40  17.80  91  24.84 
41  18.04  92  24.87 
42  18.27  93  24.90 
43  18.50  94  24.93 
44  18.73  95  24.95 
45  18.95  96  24.97 
46  19.17  97  24.98 
47  19.38  98  24.99 
48  19.59  99  25.00 
49  19.80  100  25.00 
50  20.00 44
Lotteries Participant Number: ________
For Each of the following nineteen choices put an X in the column following either Option
A or B.  One of the choices will be selected at random and the lottery to determine your payment
will be conducted at the end of the experiment.  At the end of the experiment the 19 balls numbered
1 through 19 will be placed in the lottery game.  The first  ball selected by the machine will determine
which option will determine your payoff.  Then 20 balls numbered 1 through 20 will be placed in the
machine and another ball will be selected to determine the outcome of the lottery in option B.
Choice Option A Option B
1 $5 for sure $10 if the number is greater than 1 (95% chance) 
versus $0 if the number is 1 (5% chance)
2 $5 for sure $10 if the number is greater than 2 (90% chance)
versus $0 if the number is 2 or less (10% chance)
3 $5 for sure $10 if the number is greater than 3 (85% chance)
versus $0 if the number is 3 or less (15% chance)
4 $5 for sure $10 if the number is greater than 4 (80% chance)
versus $0 if the number is 4 or less (20% chance)
5 $5 for sure $10 if the number is greater than 5 (75% chance)
versus $0 if the number is 5 or less (25% chance)
6 $5 for sure $10 if the number is greater than 6 (70% chance)
versus $0 if the number is 6 or less (30% chance)
7 $5 for sure $10 if the number is greater than 7 (65% chance)
versus $0 if the number is 7 or less (35% chance)
8 $5 for sure $10 if the number is greater than 8 (60% chance)
versus $0 if the number is 8 or less (40% chance)
9 $5 for sure $10 if the number is greater than 9 (55% chance)
versus $0 if the number is 9 or less (45% chance)
10 $5 for sure $10 if the number is greater than 10 (50% chance)
versus $0 if the number is 10 or less (50% chance)
11 $5 for sure $10 if the number is greater than 11 (45% chance)
versus $0 if the number is 11 or less (55% chance)
12 $5 for sure $10 if the number is greater than 12 (40% chance)
versus $0 if the number is 12 or less (60% chance)
13 $5 for sure $10 if the number is greater than 13 (35% chance)
versus $0 if the number is 13 or less (65% chance)45
14 $5 for sure $10 if the number is greater than 14 (30% chance)
versus $0 if the number is 14 or less (70% chance)
15 $5 for sure $10 if the number is greater than 15 (25% chance)
versus $0 if the number is 15 or less (75% chance)
16 $5 for sure $10 if the number is greater than 16 (20% chance)
versus $0 if the number is 16 or less (80% chance)
17 $5 for sure $10 if the number is greater than 17 (15% chance)
versus $0 if the number is 17 or less (85% chance)
18 $5 for sure $10 if the number is greater than 18 (10% chance)
versus $0 if the number is 18 or less (90% chance)
19 $5 for sure $10 if the number is greater than 19 (5% chance)
versus $0 if the number is 19 or less (95% chance)